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EFFECTS OF THE CHANGING TAx TREATMENT UPON
FEDERAL REVENUES
1 REVENUES HIGHLY ERRATIC
The federal government's net revenues from its tax treatment of
capital gains and losses have been highly erratic. Individuals with
net incomes paid more than $1.5 biffion in such taxes in the 4 years
of the stock boom, 1926-29; in the next 5 years their tax reductions
because of the allowances for capital losses exceeded the taxes paid
on their gains by $151 million. This figure does not measure the full
revenue loss from this source during the 5 years because it does not
include the taxes saved on their ordinary income by persons who,
because of net capital losses, were enabled to report no taxable in-
come. Their returns were excluded from the Treasury's estimates of
net tax receipts from capital transactions before 1935, though they
have been included for subsequent years. Capital gains and losses of
individuals again returned negative revenues in 1940 and 1941,
and the net positive yield for 1935-41, including deficit returns,
averaged only $30 million a year. But after a modest recovery, to
$68 million in 1942, the net receipts from this source soared to
roughly $2.2 biffion in the 4 years 1943-46, or 44 percent more
than in 1926-29, and preliminary estimates indicated $500 million
in 1947.1
1Table90. In estimating net revenues from the tax treatment of capital gains
and losses for 1926-34 the Treasury's method was as follows: To the surtax
net income in each net income group, the statutory amounts of the net capital
losses were added back and the statutory amounts of the net capital gains
were subtracted, yielding a figure for statutory net income other than capital
gains and losses. To this figure the Treasury applied the average tax rate for
each net income group; the product is the estimate of tax revenues on income
exclusive of capital gains and losses.
There was no attempt to weight the estimate for each income group by
the dispersion around the average, and no allowance was made for the revenue
losses occasioned when individuals with net incomes from other sources were
enabled to report net deficits on their operations as a whole because of net
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The proportion of total individual income tax receipts attribu-
table to capital gains taxes has also varied greatly. In 1928 such
taxes accounted for nearly half of the total, and the proportion ex-
ceeded 40 percent in the 4 years 1926-29 as a whole. This situation
changed abruptly with the onset of the depression. In 1930-32, and
again in 1940-41, as noted above, tax reductions resulting from the
allowances for capital losses exceeded tax receipts from capital
gains. In the other years between 1933 and 1942 the proportion of
total individual income tax revenues contributed by capital gains
and losses ranged from 14.1 percent in 1936 to less than .5 per-
cent in 1939. With the tremendous rise of incomes and income tax
rates during the war and early postwar years, even the large capital
gains revenues of 1943-47 constituted only 1.8 to 5.2 percent of the
annual individual income tax receipts.
Those who regard stability of yield as an essential characteristic
of a satisfactory revenue source will obviously find that capital gains
have been badly wanting in this respect. Congress has gone far since
1933 to reduce one cause of the instability by severely restricting the
deductibility of net capital losses from other income. In consequence,
even though taxpayers in the aggregate reported more capital losses
than gains in all except 1 of the 10 years 1933-42, and reported an
aggregate loss excess of $3,961 million for the decade as a whole,
the Treasury obtained a positive net revenue from its tax treatment
of these items.
The present restrictions ensure that the net revenues will rarely
if ever be negative for taxpayers as a whole and that, at worst, an
occasional negative yield will be held to a very small figure. By limit-
ing the deductibility of a taxpayer's net capital loss from other in-
come to $1,000 in any one year and by permitting his excess of
capital losses to be offset against his capital gains of the succeeding
5 years, the treatment in force since 1942 makes for a more stable
flow of revenue. This carryforward provision makes for a significant
degree of averaging losses against gains. Not only are net losses pre-
vented from making serious inroads on the tax revenues of the year
in which they occur; in addition, the taxes otherwise payable on the
capital losses. Both these deficiencies in the Treasury's estimates for 1926-34
were severely criticized in an unpublished study, Capital Gains Tax, made
for the New York Stock Exchange in 1947 by L. Robert Driver. For the years
since 1935, the Treasury has used more refined procedures and included
deficit returns. Consequently the estimated net revenues for 1926-34 in Table
90 are higher than they would be if made on the same basis as those for
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net gains of prosperous years are reduced by the allowance for
losses carried over from preceding years.
But this partial averaging is open only to those who first incur
net capital losses and in subsequent years realize net gains. It does
nothing to even out the taxable incomes of those whose years of net
gains precede their years of net losses, or of those whose net gains
vary widely from year to year. In the absence of more complete
averaging, the possibilities of which are discussed in Chapter 11,
continuing great irregularity in the tax receipts from capital trans-
actions seems inevitable.
Instability of yield in a source of revenue has traditionally been
regarded as a serious defect because it makes budget balancing dif-
ficult and may therefore endanger the government's credit. Since the
depression of the 1930's, however, the desirability of stable revenues
for a central government has been seriously and widely questioned.
Indeed, many have urged a compensatory instability to offset oppo-
site fluctuations in the private sector of the economy. A central gov-
ernment that insists upon collecting substantially the same amount of
tax revenues in years of bad business as in good will, it is argued,
accentuate the economy's difficulties in bad years by absorbing a
larger proportion of the reduced private incomes, and exaggerate
the prosperity of good years by taking a smaller proportion of the
enlarged private incomes. Many persons who strongly oppose the
view that a central government can usefully or safely incur a pro-
longed succession of budgetary deficits nevertheless favor seeking
a balanced budget only for a business cycle rather than for each
and every year. They would have the government deliberately incur
deficits by reducing tax collections or spending more in bad years
and collecting exceptionally large revenues or sharply reducing
expenditures in good years.
And among those who share this general viewpoint a large num-
ber see certain advantages in varying tax receipts rather than public
expenditures as far as possible: the former better protects the pri-
vate sector of the economy from encroachment by the government;
through a heavy use of taxes that are highly responsive in yield to
changes in national income, such as graduated income taxes, it lends
itself to automatic operation in considerable degree; and adjustments
in either direction can be made with less delay, administrative cost,
and political controversy, it is contended, than are involved in gov-
ernment spending programs. For those who hold any variant of the
view that a central government's taxing policy should attempt to
compensate for fluctuations in private spending, the instability of206 CHAPTER8
yield of capital gains taxation may appear benign, for a large excess
of net capital gains tends to be realized in good years and smaller
gains or net losses in bad, with the result that private incomes are
reduced in prosperity and better maintained in depression.
It is doubtful, however, that capital gains will ever again contrib-
ute as big a proportion of total income tax revenues as they did in
1926-29. Although another stock market boom of the same or
greater intensity and duration may well occur, our changed tax
structure will alter its revenue significance. In 1926-29 personal
exemptions and credits for dependents were so generous that only a
few hundred thousand persons paid income taxes, and the individual
income tax, including taxes on capital gains, yielded only slightly
more than $1 billion in the best year. Taxes on ordinary income did
not reach $600 million in any year.
In 1948, in contrast, more than 36 million individuals and fidu-
ciaries filed taxable returns and their aggregate income tax liability
approximated $16 billion. The amount of capital gains tax revenues
that constituted nearly half of total individual income tax receipts
in 1928 constituted less than 4 percent in 1948. In 1947 the actual
proportion was about 2.7 percent. This percentage was raised some-
what under the Revenue Act of 1948 which, for individuals with
sizeable incomes, reduced the effective tax rates on ordinary income
much more sharply than on capital gains. The bracket rates on
ordinary incomes were cut, and division of income between husband
and wife was permitted, but the ceiling tax rate of 25 percent on
long term capital gains was not altered. The rearmament program
that was set in motion by the invasion of South Korea in June 1950
substituted the certainty of early and heavy tax increases for any
possibility of further tax reductions. Some of these were made late in
1950, and additional tax revenues of $16.5 billion were requested
by the President for the fiscal year beginning July 1, 1952. Hence,
though taxes on capital gains may be expected to produce substantial
absolute amounts of receipts in good years and small sums in bad
years, the fluctuations are likely to have a relatively minor impact
upon total federal revenues. For this reason the fluctuating character
of capital gains tax revenues is now quantitatively unimportant,
whether regarded as a defect or virtue.
2 WOULD A LOW TAX RATE INCREASE THE REVENUE YIELD?
The contention has been frequently advanced before Congressional
committees that the revenue from capital transactions would beCHANGING TREATMENT AND FEDERAL REVENUES 207
vastly increased if capital gains, both short and long term, were sub-
ject only to a uniform low flat rate of about 10 percent, and all
allowances for net capital losses against ordinary income eliminated.
In 1942 one witness presented calculations purporting to show that
such a treatment might be expected to produce annual revenues of
$200-600 miffion, as against the actual average annual yield of
about $30 million in
Such estimates are based upon two assumptions: that the volume
of transactions and of realized gains is extremely sensitive to tax
rates and that any significant allowance for net losses must drastically
reduce revenue.
The first assumption is not supported by the data reviewed in
Chapters 6 and 7. We found that although the changing tax treat-
ment doubtless influenced the amounts of gains and losses realized,
other forces, such as the trend and level of stock prices, have been
of greater aggregate significance and have commonly swamped the
influence of tax changes. The practical effect of these other forces
is to reduce the responsiveness of capital gains and losses to tax
changes: because of them, reductions in tax rates have a smaller
stimulating effect and increases a smaller depressing effect upon the
gains realized. The tax treatment was unchanged in 1926-31, yet
the revenue yield ranged from $576miffionin 1928 to a revenue
loss of $89 million in 1931 (Table 90). In the face of increases in
tax rates in 1936 over 1935, the realized net gains of individuals
with net incomes nearly doubled. The reduction to 15 percent in
the maximum tax rate in 1938-41 on gains from assets held more
than 18 months produced no semblance of the huge revenues derived
from long term gains during the late 1920's, when a 12.5 percent
maximum rate was in force. Under a 25 percent maximum rate in
1945 and 1946, net capital gains exceeded the high levels of the late
1920's and net revenues from transactions in capital assets were
higher than in any preceding year. Although total net capital gains
in 1945 for individuals with net incomes were about equal to those
in 1928, the tax revenue from them was about 25 percent larger.
The long run revenue cost of the present allowance for net capital
losses cannot be estimated with confidence until we have had more
experience with it. Its chief impact upon revenues is likely to come
from the full deductibility of such losses against the capital gains
2ElishaM. Friedman, Revenue Revision of 1942, Hearings, Ways and Means
Committee, p. 1656. The $30 million average yield cited by Mr. Friedman is
reduced to $16 million by later Treasury estimates.208 CHAPTER 8
of the succeeding 5years,rather than from the $1,000 allowance
against ordinary income in the current and each of the succeeding
5years.The 5-year carryforward can accumulate to a huge sum
during a series of bad years. The net capital losses reported by indi-
viduals in 1930-34, for example, totaled $11.7 billion, while net
gains were only $2.9 biffion. In every year 19 18-45 except 1927-29
net capital gains were less than the aggregate net capital losses of
the preceding 5years,but in 1946 net capital gains exceeded the
aggregate net capital losses of the preceding 5years.
But these figures do not mean that taxable capital gains would
have been extinguished if the present carryforward had been in
force. They pooi the results of the divergent experiences of different
persons, while taxes are assessed on an individual basis. Many tax-
payers who had incurred heavy losses in 1930 or 1931 did not share
in the capital gains subsequently enjoyed by some individuals, while
not all the latter had previously sustained capital losses. The credit
for losses carried forward by the one would not have reduced the
tax liabilities of the other. Death, as well as ill-fortune in specula-
tion, may remove the tax-reducing power of a taxpayer's loss
forward. For these reasons, ready and precise inferences about the
revenue results cannot be drawn from the totals of gains and losses
of taxpayers as a whole. Nevertheless, these aggregates indicate that
very substantial remissions of taxes in good years are likely from
the credits for losses carried forward.
The reduction in revenue resulting from a taxpayer's actual use
of such credits will, in a sense, merely prevent an overpayment of
taxes. It will only reflect the use of a period longer than 1 year in
which to measure the net gain from his transactions in capital assets,
provided his losses precede his gains. And because the remission in
taxes otherwise payable is confined to those who have actually in-
curred previous losses, the net loss carryforward is a more selective
provision than alternative proposals that would deal with capital
losses categorically without discriminating among taxpayers, such
as completely disallowing capital losses.
The net revenues from the tax treatment of capital gains and
losses reflect not only the volume of capital transactions and tax
rates but also the opportunities for tax avoidance and the extent to
which they are used. The technical realization of artificial losses and
the technical avoidance of realizing gains by various legal devices,
some of which are noted in the next chapter, as well as the tax-
payer's ability to time many transactions with an eye to tax advan-CHANGING TREATMENT AND FEDERAL REVENUES 209
tage, all take their toll of possible tax revenues. What is probably the
largest single source of revenue loss in connection with capital gains
is the elimination, by the owner's death of all tax liability for pre-
vious unrealized increases in the value of his property. And, as we
have noted, the opportunity to avoid completely the capital gains
tax by leaving the sale of appreciated property to one's heirs doubt-
less inhibits many transactions. Even a capital gains tax of only 10
or 15 percent, while low relative to income tax rates, appears costly
to many investors when compared with the zero rate of tax on the
gains embodied in property transferred at death.
3 REVENUES FROM CAPITAL GAINS AND THEIR ADMINISTRATIVE
COST
Although revenues were large in some years, the average annual net
tax revenues from capital gains and losses in the entire period 1917-47
have been small, and may even have been negative. The Treasury's
estimates, we have noted, do not cover years before 1926, and do
not include deficit returns for years before 1935. Capital losses
were heavy in 1920 and 1921, when they were fully deductible from
ordinary income and when the latter was taxed at high rates; and no
absolute limit existed on the deductibility, at a maximum rate of
12½ percent of the loss, of the huge long term net capital losses
reported in 1929-33. Even if we disregard deficit returns before
1935, the average annual net revenue from capital gains and losses
in 1926-47 was only about $200 million. While tax rates on capital
gains are now much higher, they do not ensure larger average rev-
enues for a long period because of the possibility that the revenues
otherwise arising from the gains of good years may now be largely
offset by net losses carried forward from the preceding 5 years.
In view of the small, uncertain, and fluctuating revenues derived
from capital gains and losses, the question has repeatedly been
asked whether they are worth their administrative and legal costs.
Driver (see note 1) has charged that no other sections of the Internal
Revenue Code are so difficult to interpret and enforce, and that these
sections deter or distort numerous business transactions, including
various kinds of corporate reorganizations and exchanges. The con-
clusion is usually drawn that if capital gains and losses were ex-
cluded from the calculation of taxable income, these frictions and
wastes would be greatly reduced or eliminated.
In the main this conclusion is fallacious. Some difficulties of tax-
payer compliance and administrative costs and litigation might well210 CHAPTER8
be reduced. But the chief source of controversy and of tax-motivated
legal expedients on the part of taxpayers and their lawyers would
remain. The present elaborate enforcement efforts and controversies
in this connection arise, for the most part, precisely because capital
gains are taxed at lower rates than ordinary income. It is this prefer-
ential treatment that necessitates a nice distinction on the part of
taxpayers, tax administrators, and the courts between capital gains
and ordinary income. To exempt capital gains from income taxes
would mean to put a zero rate of tax on them as compared with the
substantial rates on ordinary income. Such a change would increase,
not diminish, the inducement offered taxpayers to attempt to make
their ordinary income take the form of capital gains as far as
possible.
The same considerations apply to capital losses. At present, when
capital losses are allowed only in part, the taxpayer has a motive
to cause capital losses to assume the form of ordinary losses, and to
contend that all borderline cases are cases of ordinary rather than
capital losses. But the exclusion of capital losses from taxable in-
come would not remove this motive. On the contrary, to deny all
allowance for capital losses would give taxpayers a stronger motive
than ever for contending that all losses are ordinary losses.
It may well be argued, therefore, that the mere enforcement of
the graduated taxes on ordinary income would require careful defini-
tion of capital gains and losses, and administrative scrutiny of the
transactions from which they are reported to arise. To the extent that
the administrative costs incurred in connection with the capital gains
tax provisions are essential to minimize avoidance and evasion of
the ordinary income tax, they are properly chargeable to the latter.
In short, the exclusion of capital gains and losses from taxable
income would not remove the main source of administrative and
compliance difficulties because it would still be necessary for both
the taxpayer and the Treasury to distinguish sharply between ordi-
nary gains and losses and capital gains and losses. Indeed, if the
elimination of such difficulties were our primary objective, it would
be logical to move in the opposite direction: to reduce, rather than
to increase, differences in the tax treatment of ordinary income and
of capital gains and losses. The obliteration of all distinctions, for
example, would eliminate these difficulties, though it would be open
to objections of other kinds already noted.